





By Frank Santini, Esq. | Santini Research
Report published July 2026 | Florida law status reviewed September 9, 2026
Florida’s Wrongful Death Act does not treat every negligence-related death the same. Section 768.21(8), Florida Statutes, creates a medical-negligence-specific exception that prevents adult children from recovering the damages otherwise described in subsection (3) and prevents parents of an adult child from recovering the damages otherwise described in subsection (4). Critics commonly refer to this provision as Florida’s “Free Kill” law. That phrase is a nickname, not the statute’s official title.
The distinction can have major practical consequences. Section 768.21(8) does not make medical negligence lawful, immunize healthcare providers from every form of liability, or eliminate every potential damage in every affected case. Instead, it removes specified noneconomic survivor damages, including compensation tied to lost parental companionship and mental pain and suffering, from categories of families who could potentially recover those damages if the same death resulted from another form of negligence. In cases involving an unmarried adult with limited wage-based or estate damages, that exclusion can leave too little recoverable value to make an expert-intensive medical-malpractice case economically feasible. The report examines that accountability gap in detail.
The Accountability Gap examines the history of §768.21(8), the families affected by it, Florida’s unsuccessful 2025 and 2026 repeal efforts, arguments concerning malpractice costs and physician availability, Florida’s own physician-workforce data, existing malpractice screening requirements, and the institutional forces that shape how evidence reaches policymakers.
Florida’s so-called “Free Kill” law is § 768.21(8) of the Florida Wrongful Death Act.
Ordinarily, Florida law allows specified family members to recover certain noneconomic damages when another person’s negligence causes a death. Section 768.21(8) makes an exception when the wrongful death claim is based on medical negligence.
For medical-negligence deaths, the statute states that the damages otherwise available under subsection (3) cannot be recovered by adult children, while the damages otherwise available under subsection (4) cannot be recovered by parents of an adult child. Florida Senate materials discussing the 2025 repeal legislation describe the practical effect as barring these noneconomic damages for an adult child age 25 or older of an unmarried decedent and for parents of an adult child in the circumstances in which subsection (4) would otherwise permit recovery.
Florida legislative staff analyses have described Florida as the only state that specifically excludes adult children and parents of adult children from these noneconomic wrongful-death damages in medical-negligence cases while treating other wrongful-death claims differently.
That distinction, not the nickname, is the subject of this report.
Yes. § 768.21(8) remains part of the 2026 Florida Statutes.
Florida lawmakers have nevertheless come close to repealing it twice in two years. In 2025, HB 6017 passed the Florida House 104–6 and the Senate 33–4 before Governor Ron DeSantis vetoed the measure on May 29, 2025.
Lawmakers tried again in 2026. HB 6003 passed the House 88–17, but died in the Senate Rules Committee on March 13, 2026. Its identical Senate companion, SB 1700, died in the Senate Judiciary Committee the same day.
The report examines why a provision that has faced overwhelming votes for repeal nevertheless remains law.
One of the principal arguments against expanding medical-malpractice liability is that greater exposure could raise insurance costs and cause physicians to leave Florida. The report takes that concern seriously: Florida has a growing and aging population, significant geographic shortages and a substantial number of physicians nearing retirement.
But Florida’s own workforce surveys complicate a simple malpractice-driven-exodus explanation.
In the Florida Department of Health’s 2023 Physician Workforce Annual Report, 2,651 physicians said they expected to relocate outside Florida within five years. The most frequently identified reasons were family considerations (34.36%), financial factors (20.86%) and a desire for change (18.37%). Liability exposure accounted for 6.41%.
The 2025 report found that 3,126 physicians planned to leave Florida, with the report’s narrative identifying family reasons (33%) and financial reasons (24%) as the leading explanations. At the same time, 8,331 physicians said they expected to stop providing direct patient care within five years, and approximately 70% of that group identified approaching retirement as the reason.
Those figures do not prove that malpractice liability has no effect on physician behavior. They do show why Florida’s physician-workforce problem cannot responsibly be reduced to a single cause.
Another concern raised in tort-policy debates is that expanded liability will lead to large numbers of weak claims.
Repealing § 768.21(8), however, would not remove Florida’s existing medical-malpractice screening system.
Under § 766.203, a prospective claimant must conduct a pre-suit investigation and obtain a verified written medical-expert opinion corroborating reasonable grounds for a medical-negligence claim. Section 766.106 then requires formal notice to the prospective defendant and generally prevents suit from being filed during a mandatory 90-day pre-suit investigation period.
The standard of care, causation requirements, expert-witness obligations and other substantive burdens would also remain.
The question presented by § 768.21(8) is therefore not whether medical-malpractice plaintiffs should have to prove negligence. They still would. The narrower question is which damages Florida law permits particular families to recover after negligence has been proven.
The report does not argue that medical-malpractice liability is cost-free or that malpractice insurance has no relationship to physician behavior. It compares those concerns with a broader body of public evidence.
Among other sources, the analysis reviews Florida physician-workforce data, Congressional Budget Office research, peer-reviewed medical-liability literature, Florida legislative records, appellate decisions, public lobbying disclosures and the Governor’s 2025 veto rationale. The report distinguishes between evidence about the medical-liability system generally and evidence that would establish that this particular survivor-damages exclusion is necessary to preserve physician supply or access to healthcare.
Its central conclusion is narrower than saying that liability does not matter: the publicly available evidence does not establish that § 768.21(8) itself is a major independent cause of statewide healthcare costs or physician availability.
The report expressly recognizes the competing concern. Access to physicians matters. Rural coverage matters. Specialist shortages and healthcare costs matter. Reasonable people can disagree about how malpractice rules affect those problems. The policy question is whether those genuine concerns establish the necessity of this particular carveout.
The distinction is important.
A damages cap limits the amount a person who is legally entitled to recover may receive. Section 768.21(8), by contrast, removes specified categories of survivor damages altogether in medical-negligence wrongful-death cases.
That difference became visible during the 2025 legislative debate. A Senate amendment that would have imposed a $1 million cap on noneconomic damages failed 18–19. The Senate then passed the underlying repeal of § 768.21(8) by 33–4.
The report does not attempt to resolve the broader political debate over medical-malpractice damage caps. It asks a different question: whether Florida should continue distinguishing certain medical-negligence deaths from deaths caused by other forms of negligence.
The report also examines a less visible part of the debate: how competing evidence is produced and presented to government decision-makers.
Healthcare systems, insurers, professional associations and other organized stakeholders possess aggregated data, actuarial resources, professional lobbyists and established channels through which complex policy arguments can be delivered quickly. Patient and family experiences, by contrast, are generally dispersed across individual cases and are much harder to aggregate into comparable evidence.
The report does not treat that imbalance as evidence of bad faith. Instead, it examines it as a feature of modern policymaking: organized, forward-looking financial projections can be easier for decision-makers to evaluate than fragmented retrospective evidence of individual harm.
Public records and lobbying disclosures surrounding the 2025 legislation are examined in that context.
The Accountability Gap is a legal and public-policy analysis, not a new actuarial model and not a new statewide malpractice-claims database.
The report does not claim that malpractice liability has no effect on healthcare costs, that every proposed liability reform is cost-free, that Florida faces no physician-workforce problem, or that every medical outcome alleged to involve negligence actually constitutes malpractice.
Instead, it tests the principal public justifications offered for retaining § 768.21(8) against publicly available evidence and asks whether that evidence demonstrates that this particular restriction is necessary. It also asks whether, at a time of deep institutional distrust, this debate presents an opportunity for the state of Florida to demonstrate that public confidence can be earned through transparency, accountability, and a willingness to reconsider entrenched policies when their stated justifications no longer withstand scrutiny.
That distinction is important to the report’s purpose and should remain visible to readers evaluating its conclusions.
The report is based on publicly available and independently verifiable materials. Its 47 cited sources include the current Florida statutes; legislative histories and bill analyses for HB 6017, HB 6003 and SB 1700; Governor DeSantis’s veto message; Florida Department of Health physician-workforce reports; Congressional Budget Office research; peer-reviewed literature in Health Affairs, the New England Journal of Medicine and other journals; Florida appellate decisions; public lobbying and campaign-finance records; and research concerning institutional trust, information asymmetry and policy framing.
The complete source list and citations appear in the downloadable report.
This report was prepared as part of Santini Research’s work examining legal, public-safety and policy issues through publicly available data, government records and published research. Santini Research’s stated mission is to provide policymakers, journalists and the public with empirical evidence concerning risk, safety and accountability.
Suggested citation:
Santini, Frank. The Accountability Gap: Florida’s Free Kill Law and the Case for Justice: Costs, Access, and Limits of Accountability in Medical Malpractice Law. Santini Research, July 2026.
Current-law status reviewed: September 9, 2026.
Disclosure: The author practices plaintiff-side personal injury law and has represented families affected by Florida’s wrongful-death statute. Sources cited in the report are publicly available and independently verifiable.